[Oswyntail]

Originally Posted by Drsatan

... Therefore, BR had to order lots of untried designs from a variety of manufacturers, some of which were complete disasters (e.g. the class 14, class 17, class 21 'Baby Deltics', many of the first-generation DMUs) that lasted for only a few years. ....

I think this highlights a problem with a lot of the responses. The Class 14 was actually very successful, and not a "Modernisation Plan" design, but short-lived because of the move from hydraulic transmission; many examples had long and honourable industrial careers. No, the problem is that there is confusion between three phases:"Modernisation Plan" which produced the first generation diesels of which there were very many classes, and started in the mid-50s; "Beeching", which refers to the [over]rationalisation of the network and modernisation of some industrial practices, early to mid 60s; and "post-modernisation standardisation" when the results of the modernisation plan were "analysed" and standard classes agreed on (These were: Type 1 - Class 20; Type 2 - Class 25; Type 3 - Class 37; Type 4 - Class 47, not itself a Modernisation Plan class. There was no agreed need for a standard Type 5) late 60s/early 70s. It was as a part of this last phase that the decision to abandon hydraulics was made.
The real problem was that, post-war the railways were in a confused mess, and no one really knew what nationalisation was meant to achieve. Unlike much other industry, the basic infrastructure had not been destroyed, so its replacement and renewal was not seen as a priority. This allowed the developing road lobby to steal a march and become the dominant transport voice, so that, by the time it was realised what a mess railways were in they were fighting a losing battle.
It is worth remembering (if slightly off-topic) that the standardisation of classes was made very easy by the fact that the chosen classes were really the only ones that actually worked as intended. Even then, mistakes had been made such as the expanded order for class 31s and 45s.

[j0hn0]

In response to the first question, I don't think he did all that badly, although he could've done one or two things differently.

There were so many routes and so many duplicates that I think that he did pick the wrong ones in some cases. Like the Great Central through Nottingham to Sheffield and Manchester.

Also the Great Central south of Rugby could now serve as a high speed line, were the french planning that in 1961? Perhaps Japan were but that wouldnt ve been on our agenda at that time because it was cost cutting, not investment that was the purpose of the plan.

Branch lines well, its different. More straightforward really as they dont serve as diversionary or freight links.

[Fincra5]

What Beeching deffinately did wrong was to close the line from Uckfield-Lewes. Leaving the brighton mainline very busy.

[furryfeet]

Originally Posted by Spagnoletti

It might have been more sensible to invest in improving RA on the routes at the edge of the network.

not just the edge either !

How about the main lines ? Although this was probably outside Beechings brief.

I seem to recall that the Macmillan govt imposed cost cutting measures during the WCML electrification in 1962 that restricted the height under the wires to 13ft 1 inch, which is still the "go anywhere" height today.
So in this instance Beeching was only partly responsible - did he actually resist the govt on this as he was the BR chairman at the time ?

Can anyone shed light on what happened here ?

[A0wen]

Originally Posted by j0hn0

In response to the first question, I don't think he did all that badly, although he could've done one or two things differently.

There were so many routes and so many duplicates that I think that he did pick the wrong ones in some cases. Like the Great Central through Nottingham to Sheffield and Manchester.

Also the Great Central south of Rugby could now serve as a high speed line, were the french planning that in 1961? Perhaps Japan were but that wouldnt ve been on our agenda at that time because it was cost cutting, not investment that was the purpose of the plan.

Branch lines well, its different. More straightforward really as they dont serve as diversionary or freight links.

Beeching is often cited as the villain where the GCR is concerned - incorrectly.

The Beeching report actually had the GCR mainline retained as a secondary route. The closure of that one lies fair and square with the BR Midland managment of the time who, coincidentally, where all ex-London Midland men - for whom the GCR was "the opposition".

Had the GCR stayed under the control of BR Eastern Region (where it was originally assigned) or passed to BR Western Region (where the southern section was assigned to latterly) is in interesting question.

Such parochialism wasn't unique to BR London Midland - it's no coincidence that in the West and South West ex Southern routes suffered a far greater level of closures than their ex GWR counterparts.

And some other non-Beeching closures which were enacted by BR include - The Varsity Line (Oxford - Cambridge), Lewes - Uckfield, Bridport branch, Tunbridge Wells - Eridge.

Anyone who thinks BR was a friend to the railways is mistaken.

[paul1609]

Originally Posted by Fincra5

What Beeching deffinately did wrong was to close the line from Uckfield-Lewes. Leaving the brighton mainline very busy.

Although Beeching did list the Hurst Green to lewes line as being unrenumerative the closure of Lewes to Uckfield was not Beechings plan it was down to BR and East Sussex Council

[Drsatan]

Originally Posted by Domeyhead

In Hampshire this clearly applies to Hythe<->Totton, Fareham<->Gosport, Alresford<->Winchester, and Ringwood<->Bournemouth West, but I do wonder whether it might also have saved Andover-Romsey, Bishops Waltham<->Botley, the Fareham diversion and even Lee on Solent<->Fareham which actually closed in about 1935! .

The Andover-Romsey line, also known as the 'Sprat and Winkle' was closed in 1964 under the Beeching Axe. Although the track had been relaid with CWR and 'Thumpers' had replaced M7s, Standard class 5s and other steam locomotives on local services BR decided the route was unprofitable and had to close. This was despite the fact that revenue for the route, IMO, was calculated from ticket sales from the Andover stations to intermediate stations as far as Romsey, whereas in fact most ticket sales were to Southampton and Pompey.

The line lost most of its traffic anyway when the former Midland and South West Junction Railway line to Swindon and Cheltenham closed in 1961 ( I think). The line currently survives from Andover to the MOD depot at Ludgershall. Prior to that many freight and cross-country services used the line.

There was a lot of opposition to the closure of the line, although one of the main arguments in favour of the line's closure was that whenever a down train left Andover Town station, it passed over the main road which resulted in huge traffic jams! IMO the line shouldn't have been closed because now it's impossible to travel between Andover (which since the 1960s has grown to a population of about 50000) and the Solent area (with a total population of about 250000), so quite a big market was loss. Now there isn't even a bus between Andover and Romsey

Other than that, Botley-Bishops Waltham closed to passengers in the early 1930s due to lack of use, but remained open for freight until the 1960s. I don't think reopening could be justified given the small size of the town; besides demand would be greatest for travel to Winchester which can be done by bus (Peter Symonds college kids, OAPs and the like). Lee on Solent - Fareham closed because the trams to Gosport provided a better service. If the Fareham-Gosport tram was built (which it now won't because DafT would rather see a guided busway built along the trackbed), then an extension from Gosport to Lee-on-Solent would probably be feasible.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

Originally Posted by Oswyntail

No, the problem is that there is confusion between three phases:"Modernisation Plan" which produced the first generation diesels of which there were very many classes, and started in the mid-50s; "Beeching", which refers to the [over]rationalisation of the network and modernisation of some industrial practices, early to mid 60s; and "post-modernisation standardisation" when the results of the modernisation plan were "analysed" and standard classes agreed on (These were: Type 1 - Class 20; Type 2 - Class 25; Type 3 - Class 37; Type 4 - Class 47, not itself a Modernisation Plan class. There was no agreed need for a standard Type 5) late 60s/early 70s. It was as a part of this last phase that the decision to abandon hydraulics was made.

Admittedly the class 20s were ordered for pick-up goods and local passenger services on the LM (I've seen photos of them on use on Euston-Tring locals in the early 60s) but because the traffic they were designed for disappeared, the LM decided to double-head them for use on MGR trains.

And, as part of the modernisation plan BR should have decided whether to standardise on diesel-hydraulics or diesel-electrics. If BR had decided on that rather than allowing each of the regions to do its own thing (although there are exceptions - for instance the SR needed an electro-diesel hence the 73, which has had a long and honourable career), then this would have been avoided. Moreover the mass scrapping of diesel-hydraulic locomotives in the late 60s/early 70s would have been avoided.

[gingerheid]

I think I would have to concede that times moved on and some of the lines had to close. Better roads and more cars meant that certain types of railway became as viable for moving passangers as the canals became for moving freight.

Railways had gone through a something similar to a dot com boom, and there were also railways in places that probably never should have had them, and competing railways in places that should only have had one.

However I think the axe swung too heavily, and it is regrettable that a lot of lines that should have stayed didn't (and many of them are still difficult to give the re-opening they deserve even thought they survived until the beginning of the 1980s ). His initial plans were also just plain barmy; the number of lines he initially wanted to close was worse than stupid.

[darkpowers]

Much of the blame is down to the double act of Beeching and Marples than Beeching alone. But Beeching himself wanted to go further and cut the trunk routes, but thankfully, his follow up plans were rejected and he went back to ICI.

I grew up in South East Wales where the passenger service on the Eastern Valley line from Newport to Pontypool and Blaenavon was axed in 1962. The closure cut off the then rapidly growing new town of Cwmbran from the passenger network. Not everybody had a car back then.

My father worked on several stations on the line in the late 50s and early 60s. He can recall, just prior to the closure, when timetables were suddenly altered to a very different pattern and as a result the train services no longer met with connecting services at Newport or Pontypool Road, and also were no longer convenient for workers travelling to and from shifts at Panteg steelworks or the Girlings Factory in Cwmbran. The changes put people off using the trains, which I suspect was the intention all along.

Edit: Another trick BR used, according to my father, was for all ticket revenues for longer distance journeys to be credited to Newport instead of the valley stations.

[swissrailpassion]

I live in Yorkshire which was brutally saveged by rail closures in the 60's. Many useful routes were closed.
It is essential in a transport system to have a network with wide access to many communities. Beeching cut this network and left many without a local railway.
In the 60's timetables were cut on many lines (eg Scarborough-Whitby the first train from Scarborough was 1045!) to enable a drop in numbers and then closure.
Rationalisation should have been the answer. Keep the track and routes but provide the services in a new way. Unfortunately this was not possible.
Beeching admitted that he wanted to close more lines and this ideology persisted throughout the 70's until the Settle and Carlisle rescue.

Thankfully Bob Reid (the first) turned things round.
Today the problems are still around but rather than line closures it is capacity which is the problem. We need to buy more trains and quickly to cope with demand and grow the business. A bus company would buy more buses to operate a busy service yet rail is very constrained. Pacers and Sprinter 150's are now ready for retirement. 25 years is surely long enough for these.

[Old Timer]

Originally Posted by A0wen

Anyone who thinks BR was a friend to the railways is mistaken.

BR had to live within budgets set by the Treasury.

You cannot spend what you dont have

[Katherine]

Originally Posted by swissrailpassion

In the 60's timetables were cut on many lines (eg Scarborough-Whitby the first train from Scarborough was 1045!) to enable a drop in numbers and then closure.

I think the reason for this line closure was the unstable nature of the terrain the line was sited on. Prone to coastal erosion and landslides.

[A0wen]

Originally Posted by Old Timer

BR had to live within budgets set by the Treasury.

You cannot spend what you dont have

True, but many in BR management weren't commercially minded, consequently many actions which might have reduced costs, thereby ensuring more lines remained viable, weren't pursued.

Example - how many lightly used branch lines retained their fully staffed stations rather than move to fare collection on the train ?

How many "spanish practises" existed in BR of the 1960s and 70s ?

How about the ordering of steam locos which were built as late as 1960 which saw less than 8 years use? How about the ordering of locos to support traffic which was in terminal decline ?

Beeching brought about some basic disciplines which if BR had adopted from its inception in 1948, would have prevented some of the Beeching closures.

[dhutch]

Originally Posted by Oswyntail

.. he made one fundamental error in believing that trunk routes did not depend on feeder branches...

Thats it wasnt it.
- That and closing the central line.

[Ivo]

Beeching himself though wasn't the only threat to the railways, as we all know. Even after his second plan was rejected the situation was barely any better, courtesy of all the various reasons stated before and more. But what of one David Serpell, who came to prominence twenty years after Beeching? What if his proposals had been passed, especially his idea of having a "commercial" railway?